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This paper discusses diﬀerent mechanisms of subsidy allocation invoked by
operation of law. We compare the allocation of subsidies via committees to the
allocation of subsidies through the reference principle, which binds public sup-
port to performance at the box oﬃce. The analysis is embedded in a broadly
disposed regression analysis of the determinants of the performance of German
movies in the theatrical market. It aims to identify market characteristics and
contrasts the German case with studies that address foreign markets. Finally, the
proﬁtability of the industry is considered as the presumed economic non-viability
of the industry constantly recurs in the public debate as an argument for subsidies.
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1 Introduction
This paper pursues three objectives. First, against the background of heavy
subsidization of the German ﬁlm industry, it analyzes the eﬀects of two types
of subsidy allocation: committee allocation and reference principle allocation.
Second, it seeks to identify the determinants of performance of German mo-
tion pictures. Third, the proﬁtability of the industry is considered as the
presumed economic non-viability of the industry constantly recurs in the
public debate as an argument for subsidies.
A number of econometric studies examine the performance of motion pic-
tures, e.g., Litman and Ahn (1998), Mulligan and Motiere (1994), Prag and
Casavant (1994), Sochay (1994), Wyatt (1991), and Smith and Smith (1986).
Generally, these studies apply the OLS regression technique and estimate a
ﬁlm’s success on the basis of box oﬃce receipts. The independent variables in
the regression equations typically consist of variables such as budget, genre,
reviews, stars, directors, awards, age restrictions, and distributors’ size. Al-
though these estimates are based on diﬀerent data and regression speciﬁca-
tions, the results reveal certain parallels. Broadly speaking, they suggest a
positive relation between a ﬁlm’s performance and its budget, its reviews,
and star drawing power.
The recent contributions of De Vany and Walls (1999), Ravid (1999)
and Bagella and Becchetti (1999) extend previous studies in several ways.
De Vany and Walls (1999) and Bagella and Becchetti (1999) note that distri-
butions of box oﬃce receipts are heavily skewed by the few blockbuster ﬁlms
that generate a large chunk of the industry’s total revenues. Finding that
the general OLS normality assumption is violated for their data, they em-
ploy sophisticated estimation techniques in order to overcome methodological
problems.1
De Vany and Walls (1999) suggest that box oﬃce revenues are asymp-
totically Pareto-distributed, and analyze how the marginal probability of a
“hit” can be altered with respect to several variables. They demonstrate that
extending a ﬁlm’s run and a wide release are the most important factors in
raising a ﬁlm’s hit probability.2 Budget, stars, sequels, genre types, ratings,
and year of release also have signiﬁcant inﬂuences.
De Vany and Walls (1999) further investigate the determinants of proﬁts
in the movie business. This is clearly the crucial question from a ﬁnancier’s
perspective. The related estimations exhibit a poor ﬁt, indicating there is no
1For a discussion on the consequences of nonnormality, see Judge et al. (1985), Chapter
20.
2Intuitively, of course, we would expect a “hit” with audiences is more likely to have
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formula for generating proﬁts in the motion picture industry. These results
are supported by Ravid (1999), who ﬁnds that only certain age ratings are
positively related to the rates of return on the movies in his sample.3 These
studies illustrate the widely reported “nobody knows” property in motion
picture production.4
Although most studies on motion picture performance focus on the North
American market, Bagella and Becchetti (1999) consider the Italian market.
Moreover, they investigate the eﬀects of motion pictures subsidies and ﬁnd
that the “net eﬀect” of subsidies is unrelated to a ﬁlm’s performance, al-
though subsidized movies perform, on average, more poorly than unsub-
sidized movies. They further investigate Rosen’s superstar phenomenon
(Rosen (1981)) by controlling for nonlinear eﬀects of the ex ante popularity
of actors and directors on a ﬁlm’s total admissions. They ﬁnd their data is
“...broadly consistent with this conceptual framework.” (p. 251).
The present study (i) provides an empirical analysis of the performance
of German motion pictures in terms of admission numbers and in terms of
economic success, (ii) introduces independent variables that account for both
subsidies and diﬀerent mechanisms of subsidy allocation, (iii) investigates the
feasibility of proﬁts in the German movie industry, (iv) touches on relevant
public policy issues,5 and (v) considers superstar eﬀects.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes
the major features of German ﬁlm funding, which is used as a background
for the analysis, and discusses implications of diﬀerent subsidy allocation
mechanisms. Section 3 presents the regression analysis. Section 3.1 gives a
summary of the data base and Section 3.2 illustrates the theoretical motiva-
tion for our demand model. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 analyze movie performance
in terms of admission numbers, overall rates of return, producers’ rates of
return, and distributors’ rates of return. Section 4 investigates the often-
questioned feasibility of proﬁtability in the German motion picture business.
Conclusions and policy recommendations are presented in Section 5.
3De Vany and Walls (1999) deﬁne movie proﬁts as: box oﬃce · 0.5 − budget. This mea-
sure includes revenues from the domestic theatrical market only. This probably strongly
underestimates actual proﬁts, since movie revenues from the domestic market are only part
of total revenues. Ravid (1999) deﬁnes the rate of return simply as the relation of box
oﬃce receipts and a movie’s budget. This can be problematic as the business is typically
dominated by non-linear contracts.
4De Vany and Walls (1999) cite the famous remark of screenwriter W. Goldman (1983):
“With all due respect, nobody knows anything.” Similar statements can be found in Caves
(2000) and Litman (1998).
5Rather than discuss the pros and cons of public subsidies in general, we focus specif-
ically on the eﬀects of some features of funding arrangements. For discussion of public
promotion of the arts, see e.g., Pommerehne and Frey (1990) and Frey (2000).2. GERMAN FILM FUNDING 4
2 German Film Funding
2.1 Subsidy Allocation
The German ﬁlm industry diﬀers fundamentally from the US ﬁlm industry
in that it serves a smaller domestic market, obtains heavy public funding,
and captures only a small domestic market share and a microscopic share of
the global market.6 Proponents of public subsidies argue that the German
market is too small to allow German ﬁlm producers to survive economically.7
Every year, about 60 German ﬁlms, most heavily subsidized, are premiered
in German theatres. Of the 120 ﬁlms released between 1993 and 1998 used in
this study, 105 were subsidized. Of these, subsidies covered on average more
than 55% of their production budgets.8 Total ﬁlm funding exceeded ¿ 157
million in 1998. Financial support for the motion picture industry is mainly
provided by federal and state governments. Additional money is provided
by public and private TV stations both at the federal and state level, which
in turn usually get access to the TV rights for subsidized movies. About
60% of total funding is used to ﬁnance motion picture productions, while
the remaining 40% goes to diﬀerent ﬁnancing schemes such as ﬁlm distri-
bution, vocational training, ﬁlm event funding, and fostering international
co-productions. We concentrate our analysis on public support for ﬁlm pro-
duction and distribution.
At the state level, funding committees are typically responsible for the
allocation of subsidies to individual motion pictures. Support is generally
provided in the form of a conditionally repayable interest-free loan, i.e., the
loan must only be paid back after the distribution costs (prints and advertis-
ing - P&A) and the producer’s own investment have been covered. Therefore,
subsidies from the committee principle provide some degree of insurance to
producers. Committees mainly consist of politically appointed representa-
tives and representatives from public and private TV stations.9 Therefore,
6See Table A.1 in the appendix to this paper for a brief description of the German
market. This study adheres to the deﬁnition of ﬁlm origin as speciﬁed in §15 of the
German Film Act (FFG), whereby a German ﬁlm is one which has a ﬁnal German language
version, uses predominantly German studios, and has a production company registered in
Germany.
7See Huber (2000).
8The actual fraction is probably higher, because in the case of international co-
productions, foreign subsidies are not considered due to data availability. Note that our
use of the term “subsidy” here refers to both non-repayable and conditionally repayable
ﬁnancial support.
9The Intendantenmodell (director’s model) found in the states of Berlin/Brandenburg
is an exception to this rule. The managing director of the fund, the Filmboard Berlin2. GERMAN FILM FUNDING 5
committee decisions are reached through negotiations and are likely to be
inﬂuenced by non-market factors. For instance, production companies are
often obliged to spend a certain share of the budget within the funding state
or to produce contents that somehow relate to that state. Furthermore, com-
mittees are likely to be subject to lobbying eﬀorts by producers, directors,
and distributors.
In contrast, at the federal level, most subsidies are allocated according
to the reference ﬁlm principle set forth in the German Film Act (FFG).10
The reference ﬁlm principle states that the production company of a mo-
tion picture (the reference ﬁlm) is entitled to receive non-repayable ﬁnancial
support for a new feature if the reference ﬁlm attracts 100,000 cinema ad-
missions within one year.11 The exact amount of the subsidy is computed
according to the number of admissions of the reference ﬁlm.12 Hence, sub-
sidy allocation is closely tied to the reference ﬁlm’s performance. In 1999,
the reference principle was extended to distribution.13 Unlike movie pro-
duction subsidies, distributors need only reach 50,000 admissions to qualify
for reference funding.14 Furthermore, the subsidy consists of a conditional
repayable and interest free loan, which means repayment starts only if the
costs of distribution (prints and advertising - P&A) have been covered.
2.2 Committee vs. Reference Principle
As far as we are aware, Bagella and Becchetti (1999) were the ﬁrst to investi-
gate the eﬀect of subsidies on movie performance in an econometric analysis.
They found that “...the net eﬀect of subsidies on the mean of the dependent
variable is irrelevant.” (p. 246). We question whether this result holds for the
German case. Bagella and Becchetti (1999) investigate subsidies that only
consist of below-market interest rates, while our analysis confronts a diﬀerent
situation. As stated above, subsidies account for over half of the average ﬁlm
Brandenburg, is solely responsible for funding decisions.
10See § 68 Film Act. It is important to note that committee decisions on the allocation
of subsidies also occur at the federal level.
11These viewer numbers drop to 50,000 if the reference ﬁlm receives a certiﬁcate from the
Filmbewertungsstelle Wiesbaden (FBW) or if it wins a prize at a prominent ﬁlm festival.
If the reference ﬁlm is a documentary or a children’s feature, then the required viewer
numbers fall to 25,000 within a four-year period.
12A maximum of 1.2 million admissions are taken into account. If the total number of
viewers exceeds this level, it does not lead to higher subsidies under the reference principle.
13Compare § 53 FFG.
14Again, the required number of viewers drops to 25,000 when the reference ﬁlm re-
ceives a certiﬁcate from the Filmbewertungsstelle Wiesbaden (FBW) or wins a prize at a
prominent ﬁlm festival.2. GERMAN FILM FUNDING 6
budget in Germany. Moreover, almost every ﬁlm is subsidized. We suspect
that these subsidies must have a substantial impact on the production of
German movies.
The committee principle, in particular, is likely to inﬂuence producers’
behavior. Our reasoning starts with Kornai’s seminal work on the soft bud-
get constraint (see Kornai (1979), Kornai (1980)). Kornai (1986) deﬁnes the
softening of the budget constraint as follows: “The ‘softening’ of the budget
constraint results when the strict relationship between expenditure and earn-
ings has been relaxed, because excess expenditure over earnings will be paid
by some other institution, typically by the state.” (p. 4). A fundamental
attribute of such assistance is that “...it is negotiable, subject to bargaining,
lobbying, etc.” (p. 5). This well describes how subsidies are allocated by
committees. Committee subsidies weaken the relation between expenditure
and earnings and are subject to lobbying. With respect to dynamic eﬀects
of the soft budget constraint, Kornai (1986) states:
“If the budget constraint is hard, the ﬁrm has no other option but
to adjust to unfavorable external circumstances by improving quality,
cutting costs, introducing new products or new processes, i.e., it must
behave in an entrepreneurial manner. If, however, the budget con-
straint is soft, such productive eﬀorts are no longer imperative.” (p.
10).
Applied to our case, this implies that committee subsidized production
companies may work either ineﬃciently, irrespective of market needs, or both.
Moreover, such eﬀects are likely to be reinforced for cultural reasons. Ger-
many has a long tradition of cinema as an elite art form rather than mass
entertainment.15 Thus, it is plausible to presume that some German produc-
ers will pursue objectives other than gross at the box oﬃce. Their cultural
commitments may lead them to sacriﬁce ﬁnancial prudence for their own
preferences for ﬁlm quality.16 One further reason for producing irrespective
of market needs is that committees themselves may pursue other priorities
than satisfying the audience, e.g., local employment eﬀects from movie sub-
sidization, ﬁtting a project to a TV station’s proﬁle, and the professional or
personal preferences of committee members.
In summary, our hypothesis is that subsidies allocated through commit-
tees may support ﬁlms that are unlikely to satisfy demand, because produc-
tion companies have no motivation to behave in an entrepreneurial manner
15See e.g., Jarothe (1997), p. 49.
16See Rose-Ackerman (1987) for a theoretical treatment of a similar argument. Caves
(2000) assumes that creative workers care about their products using the same line of
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and because committees can ignore market needs. Therefore, the committee
principle seems likely to entail negative eﬀects on the performance of the
German motion picture industry.
The reference principle seems a priori a more appropriate mechanism for
movie subsidization as it binds public support to the ﬁrm’s previous market
performance. Thus, it provides incentives to produce for the audience and
may help reduce the total amount of ﬁlm funding needed per viewer.
However, some conditions have to be met to make the latter beneﬁts
possible. First, production companies that gain support from the reference
principle must consistently produce movies that enjoy above-average success.
Otherwise, it would not matter if the reference subsidies ﬂow to previously
successful or to previously unsuccessful production companies.17 Second,
a ﬁlm’s success should be deﬁned in terms of economic success, i.e., in its
rate of return. Otherwise ineﬃciently high budgets, ﬁnanced by committee
subsidies, could be rewarded with reference subsidies.18 Third, and most im-
portant, we should consider that subsidies only make sense where subsidized
movies cannot cover their cost in the marketplace, i.e., they are not-for-proﬁt




The analysis includes 120 of 367 German feature ﬁlms released between 1993
and 1998. Incomplete budget data forced a limiting of the data set. We do
not expect a sample selection bias, however, as we see no incentives that could
systematically bias decisions with respect to the publication of production
budgets. Most previous econometric studies on the determinants of motion
picture success only consider successful ﬁlms. For instance, Sochay’s (1994)
study is based on Variety magazine’s list of top rental ﬁlms. Our study, in
contrast, also uses data from ﬁlms with very weak attendance. Data on such
German ﬁlms is readily accessible, because the FFG dictates publication of all
viewer numbers of funded ﬁlms. Further, the relatively small German market
facilitates data research as the domestic professional journals give more space
17It is worth to remember that this condition might not be met too easily. Consider
that the statement of screenwriter Goldman (1983):“With all due respect, nobody knows
anything.” became the motto of De Vany and Walls (1999).
18This may in fact be the case under the current per-viewer speciﬁcation of the reference
principle in § 22 FFG.3. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 8
to unsuccessful ﬁlms. The data has been gathered from a number of sources:
the periodical reports of the Filmf¨ orderungsanstalt (German Federal Film
Board - FFA), the ﬁlm journals Blickpunkt:Filmand Filmecho/Filmwoche,
the Lexikon des internationalen Films (International Film Dictionary), the
Filmbewertungsstelle Wiesbaden (Film Evaluation Board - FBW), the Inter-
net Movie Data Base, and the Spitzenorganisation der Filmwirtschaft (Head
Organization of the German Film Industry - SPIO).19 All Euro (Deutsche
Mark) amounts are adjusted to 1993 by deﬂating them with the cost of living
index of private households.
Figure 1 indicates admissions of German movies follow the typical block-
buster pattern, with a few movies drawing enormous audiences, and the rest












Figure 1: Blockbuster Property: Distribution of Admission Numbers of the
Movies in the Sample (Ordered By Rank)
The diﬀerences between the movies, in terms of audience appeal, is re-
markable. The best movie performs more than 9700 times better than the
19The author thanks Mr. Carsten Pfaﬀ from the SPIO department of statistics for
contributing data on production budgets.
20For an early analysis of the economics of blockbusters, see Garvin (1981). The most
recent German blockbuster was Der Schuh des Manitu.3. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 9
worst! Table 1 gives some more information about the distribution of admis-
sions, budgets, and subsidies of the movies in the sample.
Admissions Budgets Subsidies
Reference Committee
Average 509,002 3,684,655 544,754 1,482,569
Std. dev. 1,014,957 4,342,604 587,635 1,017,526
Maximum 6,565,342 24,877,418 3,464,844 5,879,857
Minimum 671 146,741 9,003 21,726
1% percentile 1,161 193,780 9,003 44,077
5% percentile 2,941 454,027 33,170 174,248
10% percentile 4,568 620,453 45,803 398,280
25% percentile 15,989 1,419,346 105,735 740,695
Median 77,307 2,176,058 401,831 1,371,191
75% percentile 495,076 3,901,157 749,642 1,956,793
90% percentile 1,456,680 8,743,091 1,206,931 2,725,911
95% percentile 2,622,281 11,964,230 1,439,287 3,621,047
99% percentile 4,951,385 20,451,675 3,464,844 4,154,549
n 120 120 51 104
Table 1: Admissions, Budgets (in Euro), and Subsidies (in Euro) of the 120
Movies in The Sample
We can see that the distribution of budgets is also relatively uneven.
Moreover, concerning the distribution of subsidies from diﬀerent allocation
mechanisms, we ﬁnd that reference subsidies are far more skewed than com-
mittee subsidies. This may be explained by the fact that reference subsidies
are allocated according to the variable market performance of the reference
ﬁlm.
3.2 Demand Speciﬁcation
We apply a log-linear model of demand that ensures a broad description of
the determinants of German motion picture performance. The speciﬁcation
of our model is based on the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) model of monopolistic
competition, as speciﬁed by Hameln (1991) and Hameln (1994) in the context
of an empirical analysis of Rosen’s (1981) superstar phenomenon in the record
market. Within this framework, the demand for record sales displays a log-
linear relationship with a vector of general and quality attributes of the
records (Hamlen, 1991, p. 730; 1994, p. 398). We suggest that this model ﬁts
the motion picture business as demand-side and supply-side characteristics3. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 10
of music and movie markets have quite similar structures. On the demand
side, we observe that individuals prefer to consume a wide variety of music
and movies. Further, in both markets, we can reasonably assume imperfect
substitution of lesser quality for greater quality. On the supply side, we ﬁnd
scale economies of joint consumption. As with Hameln (1991), the log-linear
speciﬁcation is also supported by the Box-Cox transformation technique,
which can be regarded as one approach to letting the data determine the most
appropriate functional form.21 Finally, the log-linear formulation allows us to
investigate Rosen’s (1981) superstar phenomenon, because it yields regression
coeﬃcients that provide elasticities.
3.3 Absolute Performance
Regression (1) examines the determinants of German feature ﬁlm perfor-
mance in terms of absolute admission numbers, which are represented by the
variable ADMISS.





The independent variables of regression (1) consist of a vector of general
and quality attributes that are supposed to aﬀect a ﬁlm’s performance.
With respect to the eﬀects of subsidies, we deﬁne four binary dummies. To
capture the features of the reference ﬁlm principle, we construct S-PROD for
successful production companies and VS-PROD for very successful produc-
tion companies. These variables distinguish whether a production company
was successful (100,000 admissions) or very successful (500,000 admissions)
according to the average admissions of ﬁlms it produced between 1993 and
1998 that were not part of the sample (see Table A.2 in the appendix to this
paper). Thus, if the reference ﬁlm principle supports consistently successful
production companies, S-PROD and VS-PROD should be positively related
to a ﬁlm’s performance. The dummy variable COMM is used to control for
the inﬂuence of committee types of funding. It reﬂects all motion pictures in
the sample that were subsidized with non-reference ﬁlm funding. Since com-
mittee subsides are allocated to both successful and unsuccessful production
21Compare Judge, Griﬃths, Carter Hill, L¨ utkepohl, and Lee (1985), p. 840.3. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 11
companies, we expect COMM not to be signiﬁcantly linked to a ﬁlm’s per-
formance. Subsidies for international co-productions are a widespread means
of ﬁlm funding. The most compelling argument for supporting international
co-productions lies in the fact that it helps to solve ﬁnancing problems for
movies with high budgets. The subsidization of international co-productions
is, however, often criticized. It is said that they have resulted in culturally
and economically unsuccessful “Europudding” ﬁlms. We set up the dummy
variable COPRODUCTION to see if there is a relationship between interna-
tional co-productions and a picture’s performance with German audiences.
Hence, the variable COPRODUCTION is intended to provide clues regarding
the validity of the competing arguments.
Most previous studies on the movie business ﬁnd that the appearance of
a star improves a ﬁlm’s box-oﬃce gross. For instance, De Vany and Walls
(1999) and Albert (1998). Furthermore, Bagella and Becchetti (1999) ﬁnd
that the ex ante popularity of actors entails nonlinear eﬀects on a ﬁlm’s to-
tal admissions. They interpret this result as empirical support in favor of
Rosen’s (1981) superstar hypothesis. However, following Hameln (1994), we
argue that popularity is only a measure of previous success and, therefore,
no objective and external measure of quality. This implies that it might not
provide evidence for the superstar phenomenon in the sense described by
Rosen (1981), who argues that small diﬀerences in quality may lead to large
diﬀerences in earnings. We therefore suggest that the ex ante popularity of
an actor is rather a measure of the knowledge that consumers have about
a particular actor. Such an interpretation ﬁts the model proposed by Adler
(1985), who argues that the superstar phenomenon exists because individual
utility increases with the individual knowledge about the work of a speciﬁc
artist. Since individual knowledge can be increased either by direct con-
sumption of the artist’s work or through discussion with other individuals,
the number of individuals that consume the work of the artist also aﬀects the
individual utility. Thus, we prefer the interpretation of ex ante popularity in
Adler’s sense. To control for the eﬀects of ex ante popularity of actors in the
German market, we deﬁne the index ACTOR (see Table A.3 in the appendix
to this paper). The value of the index is 1, 2, 3, where the number of actors
in the movie who previously had a leading role in a movie that reached at
least 400,000 admissions is 0, 1, 2 or more, respectively. If there are super-
star eﬀects, the coeﬃcient of this variable should thus be larger than one. It
is clear, however, that index construction is arbitrary by nature, so related
results should be considered with due caution.
We construct the binary dummy DIRECTOR to analyze the inﬂuence
that directors whose movies reached large audiences in the past have on
movie performance (see Table A.4 in the appendix to this paper). We would3. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 12
suggest DIRECTOR to be positively related to a ﬁlm’s performance, because
previously successful directors are likely to be both talented, and willing
to meet demand, which is not necessarily the case for directors who never
succeed.22
A ﬁlm’s budget is represented by the variable BUDGET. We expect the
budget of a ﬁlm to have a positive eﬀect on the ﬁlm’s performance. This
assumption seems tenable as features with larger budgets tend to reach more
viewers. They have the resources to ﬁnance high quality inputs for technical
equipment and other “below the line” inputs, as well as to buy creative
“above the line” inputs such as screen writers, directors and actors (see e.g.,
Prag and Casavant (1994)).
In Germany, the Filmbewertungsstelle Wiesbaden (Film Evaluation Board
- FBW) appraises features and awards ﬁlms it believes have content of
outstanding quality with the certiﬁcates “recommended” or “highly recom-
mended.” The FBW is a public institution and part of the German cultural
ﬁlm policy: a certiﬁcate can improve the chances of receiving ﬁlm funding
and, in some states, implies entertainment tax reductions. The certiﬁcates
are awarded by a committee with ﬁve members. In a formal procedure, each
movie is viewed at full length and an evaluation is carried out. We use FBW
certiﬁcates here as a proxy for critical appraisal. Accordingly, the dummies
FBWHR for highly recommended and FBWR for recommended ﬁlms are
included in the analysis.
A ﬁlm’s genre may also relate to a ﬁlm’s success (see e.g., De Vany and
Walls (1999); Prag and Casavant (1994)). Accordingly, dummy variables
are deﬁned and classiﬁed as set out in the Dictionary of International Film.
The classiﬁcations are DRAMA, CHILDREN, CRIME, and ACTION, with
COMEDY serving as the base category.23
Age restrictions may also inﬂuence the success of a movie (Ravid (1999);
Sochay (1994); Wyatt (1991)). These eﬀects are, however, ambiguous. On
the one hand, age restrictions reduce the number of potential viewers. On
the other hand, they may signal speciﬁc contents of a ﬁlm and can potentially
increase the number of viewers. In Germany, age restrictions are set by the
Freiwillige Selbstkontrolle (Organization for the Voluntary Self–Regulation
of the German Film Industry - FSK). The dummy variables FSK0, FSK6,
22See Rother (1997) for a description of the director’s role in ﬁlm production.
23The category ACTION diﬀers from the classiﬁcation in the Dictionary of International
Film and comprises genres that are rarely produced in Germany (namely action, adventure,
war, and science ﬁction). CRIME consists of movies classiﬁed as criminal and thriller.
Those movies without information available in the Dictionary of International Film were
evaluated with the help of the Internet Movie Data Base (www.imdb.com) and the internet
database of Blickpunkt:Film (www.cinebiz.de).3. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 13
FSK12 and FSK16 reﬂect the respective age restrictions, while the FSK18
age restriction serves as the default.24
In the area of ﬁlm distribution, three categories of ﬁlm distributors’ size
are considered (see Table A.5 in the appendix to this paper). These are IN-
DEPENDENT, MINIMAJOR and MAJOR. The latter is used as the base
category in the regressions. The rationale for this distinction is that a distrib-
utor’s size is linked with a ﬁlm’s marketing costs and a ﬁlm’s potential market
size. For instance, independent distributors typically focus on niche markets,
so releases by independent distributors show low numbers of release prints.
This suggests that the number of admissions of an independently released ﬁlm
should, on average, be lower. The same rationale applies, although probably
to a lower extent, to mini-majors. Hence, we expect INDEPENDENT and
MINIMAJOR to be negatively related to ADMISS.25
Table 2 presents the results of regression (1). It is revealed that VS-PROD
is positively related to a German ﬁlm’s performance in terms of absolute ad-
mission numbers. The signiﬁcance of VS-PROD suggests that, apparently,
there is a group of production companies that consistently produces excep-
tionally successful ﬁlms. However, simply successful production companies
do not show any signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect, as documented by the nega-
tive coeﬃcient and the low t-values of the S-PROD variable. Hence, the
100,000 admission threshold seems too low to ensure that only consistently
above-average performing production companies gain from the reference ﬁlm
principle.
The ex ante popularity index ACTOR shows weakly signiﬁcant positive
eﬀects. However, the coeﬃcient of ACTOR is less than one. Our analysis
thus fails to support the existence of a superstar phenomenon. On the other
hand, directors have a large positive impact on admissions. Further, while
total admissions rise with a ﬁlm’s budget, the elasticity is below one, indi-
cating that a higher budget investment does not necessarily pay itself back.
The signiﬁcance of FBWHR suggests that critical appraisal is important
with respect to the box oﬃce appeal of a movie. Moreover, ﬁlms without age
restrictions appear to have relatively good chances at the box oﬃce. Consid-
ering genre types, only dramas do signiﬁcantly worse than the base category
comedy. Finally, with regard to ﬁlm distribution we ﬁnd, as expected, that
24The FSK rating is similar to the voluntary Motion Picture Association of America
ratings.
25The primary estimation of (1) included three binary dummies that controlled for
the fact that the demand for motion pictures ﬂuctuates considerably within a year. In
Germany, ﬁlm-going is typically high around Christmas and in September, and low from
mid-April to the end of August. However, seasonal dummies showed no signiﬁcance. As
omitting the variables had no notable eﬀect on our estimates, we omit them.3. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 14
Regression (1)
Variables ADMISS
S-PROD - 0.01 (-0.03)
VS-PROD 1.08** (2.32)




















Number of obs. 120
Notes: all continuous variables are in natural logarithms.
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
*Statistically signiﬁcant at p < 0.1.
**Statistically signiﬁcant at p < 0.05.
***Statistically signiﬁcant at p < 0.01.
Table 2: Determinants of Absolute Performance in the German Theatrical
Market
MINIMAJOR and INDEPENDENT are signiﬁcantly negatively linked to a
German ﬁlm’s absolute performance.
It is plausible that there is some degree of collinearity between the inde-
pendent variables. For instance, one might expect that high budgets, famous
actors, well known directors and successful production companies are posi-
tively related. Therefore, we checked the regression and the data for signs
of multicollinearity, but found no signs indicating it. Regression coeﬃcients
were stable when adding or deleting independent variables, standard errors of
coeﬃcients were not conspicuous, and the correlation matrix showed no high3. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 15
pairwise correlations between the independent variables (see Table A.6 in the
appendix to this paper). Furthermore, the variance inﬂation factors (VIF) of
the independent variables were far below the critical value of 10 suggested in
the literature as a rule of thumb.26 Therefore, we conclude multicollinearity
is not an issue in our analysis.
3.4 Rate of Return Performance
Although the ﬁlm industry seems focused on ﬁlm attendance, from an eco-
nomic point of view, proﬁts and rates of return are clearly more important.
Moreover, an analysis of rates of return allows us to test whether very suc-
cessful producers (VS-PROD) are also signiﬁcantly positively related to rates
of return, i.e., whether they consistently produce more proﬁtably than pro-
duction companies that fail to qualify for reference ﬁlm funding. Therefore,
we seek empirical evidence on the determinants of the rate of return a ﬁlm
generates.
Calculation of Rates of Return
We consider three perspectives on a ﬁlm’s rate of return: the producer’s rate
of return (PROD-RoR), deﬁned as a producer’s proﬁts divided through the
ﬁlm’s budget; the distributor’s rate of return (DIST-RoR), deﬁned as a dis-
tributor’s proﬁt divided through the cost for release prints and advertisement
(P&A); and the overall rate of return (RoR), i.e., the sum of both types of
proﬁts divided through the sum of budget and P&A.
To calculate the speciﬁc rates of return a movie generates, it is necessary
to consider how box-oﬃce revenues are shared among exhibitors, distribu-
tors, and producers. Although contracts may vary for each movie, standard
agreements dominate the business. Usually, a share of 47% of the box oﬃce is
returned to the distributor.27 The further sharing among parties is described
by Eggers (1997), p. 101, in detail. Within a standard contract, a share of
65% is imputed to the cost of the distributor, while the other 35% remains
with the distributor, but is not imputed to recouping distribution costs. Once
distribution costs are fully recouped, the producer receives half of the addi-
tional distributor revenues. Moreover, the distributor usually guarantees a
minimum payment of about ¿ 500 per release print to the producer, irrespec-
tive of how the movie performs at the box oﬃce. This “minimum guarantee”
is added to the distribution costs that consist of the cost for release prints
and advertisement (P&A). For those movies where data is available P&A is
26See Kleinbaum, Kupper, and Muller (1988), p. 210.
27See Hauptverband Deutscher Filmtheater E.V. (1999), p. 3.3. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 16
on average ¿ 7,993 per release print (see Table A.7 in the appendix to this
paper). Therefore, we consider this number for our proﬁt calculations.
The producer’s revenue is also generated in ancillary markets (video,
DVD, pay TV and ad-supported TV, foreign sales, and in-ﬂight entertain-
ment). Since production companies do not publish related data, we estimate
ancillary market revenues on the basis of an example given by Dr. Dieter
Frank, CEO of Bavaria Film, one of Germany’s leading production houses.28
He states that a German movie with 500,000 admissions yields about ¿ 1.50
per admission from domestic TV right sales, and about ¿ 0.30 from both
video and foreign sales, which totals ¿ 2.10 per admission. To calculate pro-
ducer’s proﬁts, we add revenues calculated on the basis of these numbers to
the revenues from the theatrical market. Finally, assuming average admis-
sion prices of ¿ 5.00 in the theatrical market in the period between 1993 and
1998, we get our proxy for proﬁts and associated rates of return.
Rate of Return Regressions
Following our calculations proﬁts are negative for most ﬁlms in the sample,
which implies negative rates of return. Therefore, a logarithmic transfor-
mation of the dependent variables is not possible and the Box-Cox trans-
formation technique cannot be applied. This has two implications. First,
the theoretical foundations of the following regressions might be considered
weaker than in regression (1). However, with respect to rates of return, we
could not model demand anyway as consumers do not pay for proﬁts, but
rather for a seat in the movie theatre. Therefore, we have to consider the
following regressions against a more descriptive tenor. Second, since the cal-
culation of rates of return heavily depends on box oﬃce performance, the
distribution of these rates is also characterized by the blockbuster property,
i.e., outliers tend to dominate the means. Therefore, the least squares es-
timator is not necessarily the most eﬃcient unbiased estimator.29 We thus
apply the l1-estimator with respect to our rate of return estimations. The
l1-estimator is more robust than least squares with respect to the form of the
underlying distribution of the disturbances and gives more powerful tests
(see Judge, Griﬃths, Carter Hill, L¨ utkepohl, and Lee (1985), p. 836).30 This
leads to the following regressions:
28See Frank (1995).
29On the basis of the Shapiro-Wilk test for normality, we can clearly reject the normal
distribution of proﬁts (the associated p-values are all smaller than 0.00001).
30This estimator is also known as the least absolute value (LAV) estimator, the least
absolute residual (LAR) estimator, the least absolute error (LAE) estimator, and the
minimum absolute deviation (MAD) estimator.3. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 17















The results of regression (2) are displayed in Table 3.
Compared to regression (1), the results change considerably. While very
successful production companies, successful directors, and positive critical
appraisal are still important for success, BUDGET is also signiﬁcant, but
negatively related, to the ﬁnancial success of the movies. This is well in line
with the result of regression (1), where the related coeﬃcient interpreted as
an elasticity is below one. Further, the coeﬃcient of ACTOR is no longer sig-
niﬁcant. Interestingly, distributors’ size is not signiﬁcantly related to overall
proﬁts while it has been negatively related to absolute admission numbers.
We will turn to this point later.
Note that the overall ﬁt of regression (2) is extremely poor, with a pseudo
R2 value of only 0.07, compared to an adjusted R2 value of 0.48 in regression
(1).31 This is similar to the results of De Vany and Walls (1999), p. 310, who
31The pseudo R2 can be interpreted similarly to the R2. Judge, Griﬃths, Carter Hill,
L¨ utkepohl, and Lee (1985), p. 767, formulate that the pseudo R2 measures the “uncer-
























Number of obs. 120
Notes: numbers in parentheses are t-statistics
*Statistically signiﬁcant at p < 0.1
** Statistically signiﬁcant at p < 0.05.
***Statistically signiﬁcant at p < 0.01.
Table 3: Determinants of Overall Rates of Return
state: “That is as it should be, for were proﬁts predictable everyone would
make them.” Nevertheless, the very successful type of production companies
and experienced directors do not seem to be “everybody,” but special.
The results of the regression of producers’ rates of return are displayed in
Table 4. It is apparent that the basic set of signiﬁcant explanatory variables
remains the same. Very successful production companies, successful direc-
tors, and positive critical appraisal are signiﬁcant determinants of producer’s
rates of return.
MINIMAJOR and INDEPENDENT are signiﬁcantly negatively related
to performance here. This observation, together with our observations that
distributors’ size does not matter for overall rates of return, suggest that
smaller distributors may not perform systematically worse then larger dis-
























Number of obs. 120
Notes: numbers in parentheses are t-statistics
*Statistically signiﬁcant at p < 0.1
** Statistically signiﬁcant at p < 0.05.
***Statistically signiﬁcant at p < 0.01.
Table 4: Determinants of Producers’ Rates of Return
We ﬁnd that this presumption is supported by the results of regression
(4) of the determinants of distributors’ proﬁts displayed in Table 5.
Distributors’ size is not systematically linked with distributors’ rate of
return performance. In addition, there is no variable signiﬁcantly related
to DIST-RoR. The overall ﬁt of regression (4) is even poorer than all other
regressions, with an pseudo R2 value of only 0.06.
Why is this the case? We argue that this observation is most probably
linked to the amount of information available for producers and distributors.
Compared to the information available at the stage of ﬁlm ﬁnancing and
producing, the degree of uncertainty is much lower at the distribution level.
Above all, the ﬁlm is completed when the distributor decides on the distribu-
tion strategy, i.e., the number of release prints and the advertising measures,
























Number of obs. 120
Notes: numbers in parentheses are t-statistics
*Statistically signiﬁcant at p < 0.1
** Statistically signiﬁcant at p < 0.05.
***Statistically signiﬁcant at p < 0.01.
Table 5: Determinants of Distributors’ Rates of Return
can further be increased by test screenings. This results in a relatively re-
liable estimate of the potential market for the ﬁlm and, therefore, suitable
marketing strategies. In contrast, there is less information available and the
risk is higher when it comes to ﬁlm production and ﬁnancing. This might,
however, be an opportunity for highly skillful producers and directors with
the talent to produce ﬁlms that enjoy above-average success, and, hence, we
can detect their positive inﬂuence on a ﬁlm’s success.
4 Proﬁtability of German Movies
We have shown in the previous sections that production companies of the
VS-PROD type are consistently able to produce ﬁlms with above-average4. PROFITABILITY OF GERMAN MOVIES 21
success, both in terms of total admission numbers and in terms of rates of
return. Therefore, production companies of the VS-PROD type meet the ﬁrst
two conditions formulated in Section 2. This suggest that the reference ﬁlm
principle might be favored over committee subsidies when ﬁlms by VS-PROD
production companies fail to break even. Otherwise, reference subsidies tend
to go to deserving ﬁlms anyhow.
Using our sample data, we investigate the question of cost coverage in a
disaggregated manner, i.e., for our three diﬀerent types of production com-
panies. All movies that are international co-productions are not considered,
because our calculations of proﬁts are based on domestic admission numbers.
Table 6 gives the related values.
Production Company Types & Proﬁts
PROD
Producer Distributor Overall
Average proﬁts -1,359,989 -164,808 -1,524,797
Std. dev. 1,979,115 739,775
25% percentile -2,361,090 -369,909
Median -1,292,441 -86,253
75% percentile -561,769 -22,014




Average proﬁts -88,282 372,999 284,717
Std. dev. 5,488,466 2,053,653
25% percentile -2,308,970 -669,596
Median -1,332,264 -122,711
75% percentile -498,781 19,861




Average proﬁts 1,183,417 998,190 2,181,607
Std. dev. 6,011,214 2,437,035
25% percentile -1,642,470 -423,797
Median -1,015,952 148,246
75% percentile 1,911,310 1,373,515
Sum of proﬁts 30,542,498
n 14
Table 6: Production Company Types and Proﬁts (in Euro)
The results displayed in Table 6 show clearly that there are no proﬁts4. PROFITABILITY OF GERMAN MOVIES 22
in the German motion picture industry as long as we observe it on the ag-
gregated level. This is how the German motion picture business is usually
considered in public debate, and what provides a stimulus to subsidization.
However, with our disaggregated approach, it also turns out that production
companies from the VS-PROD type are on average proﬁtable.32 Therefore,
we can conclude that the reference principle supports VS-PROD type pro-
duction companies, despite the fact that they principally operate at a proﬁt.
Moreover, it is interesting to note that the average share of subsidies of movies
produced by the VS-PROD type is about 66% of the production budget and
that these 66% are not considered in the above proﬁt calculations.
Note that in real life, it might not be obvious that the VS-PROD type
is proﬁtable, since this type of production company also produces failures
on a regular basis. However, this is just a consequence of the inescapable
uncertainty attached to motion picture production. For instance, with re-
spect to the US market, Vogel (1998) points out: “And, in fact, of any 10
major theatrical ﬁlms produced, on the average, six or seven may be broadly
characterized as unproﬁtable.” (p. 31).
The question of proﬁtability in the distribution sphere is answered in
Table 7. For the analysis of distributors’ proﬁts we can use the whole sample,
since international co-productions do not have to be excluded to allow for a
proper calculation of proﬁts.
Distribution Company Types & Proﬁts
MAJOR MINIMAJOR INDEPENDENT
Average proﬁts 170,555 932,085 104,701
Std. dev. 1,903,007 3,309,772 1,347,372
25% percentile -1,002,132 -528,362 -195,428
Median -527,579 -28,221 -63,962
75% percentile 98,562 473,032 -18,645
Sum of proﬁts 3,581,655 32,622,975 6,700,864
n 21 35 64
Table 7: Distribution Company Types and Proﬁts (in Euro)
Interestingly, the average proﬁts in the distribution sphere are positive
for all types of distributors with a peak in the group of the mini-major type.
32We are aware that our results depend on the assumptions made about revenues in
ancillary markets. Therefore, we have calculated proﬁts for very successful producers with
alternative assumptions of ancillary market revenues. It turned out that even with half of
the values given by Frank (1995) we would still ﬁnd overall proﬁts for the very successful
type of production companies. Therefore, we can consider proﬁts to be positive even under
very restrictive assumptions.5. CONCLUSION 23
Moreover, the distribution of proﬁts varies among distributor types. Notably,
the 75% percentile of the proﬁts of independent distributors is negative, while
the 75% percentile of both other types is positive. This could indicate that
independent distributors choose ﬁlms with a higher economic risk than other
types of distributors.
5 Conclusion
Our analysis provides several results. First, a number of determinants of
performance of German movies have been identiﬁed. These are, above all,
production companies that were very successful in the past (VS-PROD), and
directors who have reached large audiences with their previous work. In other
words, the skills of the people that are closely related to managing ﬁlm project
development and realization play an essential role in ﬁlm performance. This
contrasts with the widely reported nobody knows character of the motion
picture business, since obviously some people do know at least a little more
than others about successful movie making.33 With respect, however, to
German circumstances, one might suspect that this observation is reinforced
by heavy ﬁlm subsidization, since unsuccessful producers are not necessarily
driven out of the market and, hence, the range of talent in the industry might
be enlarged artiﬁcially.
Second, the determinants of the rates of return on ﬁlms are related to the
determinants of ﬁlm performance in terms of absolute admission numbers.
However, there are exceptions. For instance, regression results indicate a neg-
ative inﬂuence of high budgets on the rate of return on a ﬁlm, although higher
budgets entail a positive eﬀect on absolute admission numbers. Therefore,
it seems counterproductive to spend money, including subsidies, on movie
projects with relatively high budgets. German ﬁlms with high budgets do
not seem to pay themselves back.
Third, the reference ﬁlm principle appears to support production com-
panies that have consistently above-average success with their ﬁlms. While
our analysis suggests that this holds only for production companies of the
very successful type (VS-PROD), our disaggregated view on proﬁts in the
German movie industry strongly suggests that production companies with
consistently above-average success are precisely the type that makes positive
proﬁts. Essentially, this means that such production companies do not need
33To be clear, we do not say that some people can actually predict the success of a movie,
but that there are more talented people that do, on average, produce more successful
movies.5. CONCLUSION 24
subsidies to produce their ﬁlms.34 This is a clear drawback to the reference
ﬁlm principle as speciﬁed in the German Film Act. While it sets incentives to
produce movies for the audience, the reference ﬁlm principle de facto violates
a central condition for legitimate subsidies in that it tends to support ﬁrms
that do not need subsidies to produce their products! Moreover, the refer-
ence ﬁlm principle is improperly deﬁned in the economic sense; it rewards
absolute admission numbers rather than proﬁtability. Combine this result
with the positive relation between budgets and absolute admission numbers
and the negative relation between budgets and proﬁts, and we arrive at the
implication that the reference ﬁlm principle sets incentives to produce ﬁlms
with excessive budgets. The committee principle, on the other hand, weakens
the relationship between expenditures and earnings and distorts producers’
incentives to make ﬁlms suited to audience preferences. Therefore, both
principles entail negative eﬀects on economic eﬃciency.
Recognizing that subsidization of the German ﬁlm industry is a political
reality, we suggest that an adjusted reference ﬁlm principle may be prefer-
able. Such adjustments may demand that the reference ﬁlm principle rewards
economic success instead of absolute admission numbers and that it reduces
producers’ “extra” proﬁts, for instance, by prescribing some type of sharing
contract between the state and the producer. Incentives to produce for the
market could still be set, but “extra” proﬁts would be limited.
Fourth, on examining the ﬁeld of distribution, it became clear that dis-
tributors categorized as independents or mini-majors are negative determi-
nants of performance both in terms of admission numbers and producers’
proﬁts. However, these results are not relevant to evaluating a distributor’s
skills, since there is no systematic relation between a distributor’s size and a
distributor’s proﬁt performance. Moreover, there are clearly positive proﬁts
in the distribution sphere, irrespective of the distributor type. Therefore,
subsidies in the distribution sphere are also questionable.
Finally, our analysis provides no evidence that supports the superstar hy-
pothesis on the basis of our necessarily arbitrary ex ante popularity measure
for actors. However, primarily with respect to the paramount positive eﬀects
of very successful production companies and directors, we suggest that ad-
equate measures of talent and ex ante popularity may produce results that
34We stress here that even currently existing VS-PROD type production companies
would be in danger of bankruptcy if all subsidies were abolished. The reason is that these
companies produce only about 1 to 4 movies per year. Given the enormous uncertainty
attached to the movie business such a small number of projects would hardly provide
enough potential for risk diversiﬁcation to assure the economic existence of such companies.
Therefore, the structure of the entire industry has to change to allow for non-subsidized
ﬁlm production in Germany.5. CONCLUSION 25
support the superstar phenomenon in the sense of Rosen (1981) or Adler
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Table A.2: Deﬁnition of the Variables S-PROD and VS-PROD
Production company Admissions per movie (average) Category





Diana Film 3,250,411 VS-PROD
Dream Joint Venture 137,052 S-PROD
Ecco Film 392,781 S-PROD
ENA 710,081 VS-PROD
Futura Film 144,305 S-PROD
Hager-Moss Film 1,236,373 VS-PROD
John Filmproduktion 571,930 VS-PROD
Lichtblick 123,213 S-PROD
Mr. Brown 710,081 VS-PROD
Olga-Film 137,522 S-PROD
Pandora Film 351,276 S-PROD
Prokino 137,522 S-PROD
Real Film 101,369 S-PROD
Rialto 346,204 S-PROD








Source: Business Reports of the FFA 1993-1998, own calculations.
This list enumerates all production companies that have produced German
ﬁlms (i) with more than 100,000 viewers (ii) premiering between 1993 and 1998,
and (iii) not included in the sample used for the regressions. Classiﬁcation in the
category VS-PROD occurred only with ﬁrms that had average viewer numbers per
ﬁlm of over 500,000. It is interesting to note that German production companies
usually produce only a few ﬁlms per year; e.g., in only two instances between 1993
to 1998 did a production company produce more than three ﬁlms in one year.APPENDIX 31




Becker, Ben Schlafes Bruder (1995)
Berben, Iris
Binoche, Juliette Die Liebenden von Pont-Neuf (1991)
Bleibtreu, Moritz Das Stadtgespr¨ ach (1995)
Brandauer, Klaus-Maria
Close, Glenn




Heinze, Thomas Allein unter Frauen (1991)




Kr´ ol, Joachim Wir k¨ onnen auch anders (1993)
Lauterbach, Heiner





Paul, Christiane Knocking on Heavens’ Door (1997)
Piccoli, Michel
Potente, Franka Nach f¨ unf im Urwald (1995)
Richter, Ilja
Richter, Jason James Free Willy (1993)
Riemann, Katja Abgeschminkt (1993)





Schrader, Maria Keiner liebt mich (1994)







Vogel, J¨ urgen Kleine Haie (1992)
Wiesinger, Kai Kleine Haie (1992)
Apart from long time well known actors, actors who have recently played a leading
role (as shown by the Internet Movie Database or the Internationales Lexikon des Films,
respectively) in a popular movie have also been taken into account. Accordingly, these
“new” well known actors have only been integrated into the analysis after enjoying their
ﬁrst big success (more than 400,000 admissions). In these cases we have cited the relevant
ﬁlms and the years in which they premiered. Finally, celebrities whose popularity has
resulted in ﬁlm appearances have also been listed. These are Helge Schneider, Tom Gerhart
and the cabaret artists of “Badesalz”.APPENDIX 32
Table A.4: Successful Directors
August, Billie
Buck, Detlev Karniggels (1991)
D¨ orrie, Doris
Garnier, Katja von Abgeschminkt (1993)
Hahn, Gerhard Werner - Beinhart (1990)
Kaufmann, Rainer Stadtgespr¨ ach (1995)
Peter, Timm Go Trabi Go (1991)
Schaack, Michael Werner - Beinhart (1990)
Schl¨ ondorﬀ, Volker
Trotta, Margarethe von




Wortmann, S¨ onke Allein unter Frauen (1991)
Successful directors are, like their acting counterparts, established directors
or directors who have recently directed a popular ﬁlm (more than 400,000 ad-
missions). These “new” well known directors have only been integrated into the
analysis after enjoying their ﬁrst big success. In these cases we have cited the
relevant movies and the years in which they premiered.APPENDIX 33
Table A.5: Distributors’ Size, 1993-1998
Distributor 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Categorya
Buena Vista 16 23 21.8 17.9 20.1 21.2 MAJOR
CI 0 5 6.2 0 0 0 MINIMAJOR
Columbia 16 9 8.5 7.6 12.4 7.2 MAJOR
Concorde 2 3 4.4 5.2 2 2 MINIMAJOR
Constantin 3 0 4.4 9.9 9 4.3 MINIMAJOR
Delphi 0 0 0 2.7 0 0 INDEPENDENT
Fox 7 8 3.3 12.7 11 21.7 MAJOR
Jugendﬁlm 0 0 0 1 0 0 INDEPENDENT
Kinowelt 0 0 0 1.4 5.1 5.8 MINIMAJOR b
Pandora 2 0 1.2 2 0 0 INDEPENDENT
Polygram 0 0 0 0 7.5 2.7 MINIMAJOR
Prokino 0 0 0 1.1 0 2 INDEPENDENT
Scotia 2 0 4.3 0 0 2.3 INDEPENDENT
Senator 3 3 3.2 0 4.5 2.1 MINIMAJOR
Tobis 3 3 1.3 0 3 2 MINIMAJOR
UIP 20 27 21.6 23.7 14.9 16.8 MAJOR
Warner 21 15 14.6 8.6 7.2 7.6 MAJOR
Other 5 4 5.2 6.2 3.3 2.3 INDEPENDENT
Sum 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Blickpunkt:Film. Filmecho/Filmwoche.
aApproximated values are given for the years 1993 and 1994. Classiﬁcation is
based on average market share (admissions) between 1993 and 1998: Major
starting at 10%, Minimajor starting at 1.5%, and Independent less than 1.5%.
bKinowelt was the only company to record steady growth between 1993 and
1998. Accordingly, it has been categorized as Independent for the years


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.7: Correlation Between P&A and the Number of Prints at Release
Title P&A (Euro) Prints P&A per print (Euro)
Feuerreiter 306,264 30 10,209
Requiem f¨ ur eine romantische Frau 384,696 30 12,823
Fette Welt 255,646 34 7,519
Zugv¨ ogel 386,537 48 8,053
Trio, Das 1,210,739 55 22,014
Kurz & Schmerzlos 441,245 60 7,354
Musterknaben, Die 588,944 70 8,413
S¨ udsee, eigene Insel 1,014,090 76 13,343
Palmetto 772,419 88 8,777
Frauen l¨ ugen nicht 613,550 98 6,261
Bis zum Horizont 434,598 156 2,786
Lola rennt 1,073,713 209 5,138
Frau Rettich... 810,909 216 3,754
Solo f¨ ur Klarinette 1,027,958 229 4,489
Campus, Der 1,829,390 286 6,396
Cascadeur 1,114,105 299 3,726
Merkw¨ urdige Verhalten..., Das 1,738,392 360 4,829
Average: 7,993
Correlation (P&A and prints): 0.79
Source: German Federal Film Board (FFA), Blickpunkt:Film, own calculations.APPENDIX 36
Table A.8 : Movies in the Sample
...und der Himmel steht still Lola rennt
00 Schneider - Jagd auf Nihil Baxter Looosers
14 Tage Lebensl¨ anglich Lorenz im Land der L¨ ugner
2 M¨ anner - 2 Frauen - 4 Probleme? Mambospiel, Das
Abbuzze! - Der Badesalz-Film Mann f¨ ur jede Tonart, Ein
Adamski M¨ annerpension, Die
Alles auf Anfang Maria
Alles nur Tarnung Maries Lied
Apothekerin, Die Mario und der Zauberer
Asterix in Amerika Mediocren, Die
Auf Wiedersehen, Amerika Moebius
Auge um Auge Mr, Bluesman
Ballermann 6 Mutters Courage
Bandits Nach f¨ unf im Urwald
Beim n¨ achsten Kuß knall ich ihn nieder Nostradamus
Benjamin Bl¨ umchen - Seine sch¨ onsten Abenteuer Nur aus Liebe
Bewegte Mann, Der Nur ¨ uber meine Leiche
Broken Hearts Obsession
Bunte Hunde Palmetto
Cascadeur Peanuts - Die Bank zahlt alles
Charlie & Luise - Das doppelte Lottchen Pippi Langstrumpf
Childmurders - Kindermorde Prinz Eisenherz
Comedian Harmonists Prinzenbad
Couch in New York, Eine Probefahrt ins Paradies
Diebinnen Putzfraueninsel, Die
Dreifache Locke, Die Ratte, Die
Echte Kerle Rennschwein Rudi R¨ ussel
Einfach nur Liebe Rotwang muß weg!
Erste Semester, Das Roula
Ex Schelme von Schelm, Die
Felidae Schlafes Bruder
Frankie, Jonny und die Anderen Sieger, Die
Franz¨ osische Frau, Eine Solo f¨ ur Klarinette
Frau Rettich, die Czerny und ich Spur der roten F¨ asser, Die
Frauen sind was Wunderbares Stalingrad
Fr¨ aulein Smillas Gesp¨ ur f¨ ur Schnee Stille Nacht
Friedrich und der verzauberte Einbrecher Story von Monty Spinneratz
F¨ ur immer und immer Strand von Trouville, Der
Furchtlosen Vier, Die Stumme Zeugin
Geisterhaus, Das T¨ odliche Maria
Gespr¨ ach mit dem Biest T¨ odliches Verh¨ altnis, Ein
Handbuch des jungen Giftmischers, Das Totmacher, Der
Harald Transatlantis
High Crusade - Frikassee im Weltraum Tykho Moon
Hollow Reed - Lautlose Schreie Und keiner weint mir nach
Honigmond Underground
Hunger - Sehnsucht nach Liebe Unendliche Geschichte III, Die
Inge, April und Mai Unhold, Der
Japaner sind die besseren Liebhaber Unter der Milchstrasse
Jenseits der Stille Utz
Jenseits der Wolken Versprechen, Das
Karakum Werner - Das muß kesseln!!!
Kaspar Hauser Widows - Erst die Ehe dann das Vergn¨ ugen
Knockin’ on Heavens’ Door Willy Bogners White Magic
Keiner liebt mich Winterschl¨ afer
Lea Wir k¨ onnen auch anders
Leben ist eine Baustelle, Das Workaholic
Legende von Pinocchio Younger & Younger
Let’s talk about Sex Zirri - das Wolkenschaf
Liebe und andere Gesch¨ afte Zugv¨ ogel...einmal nach Inari